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God and the global economy: religion and attitudes towards trade and
immigration in the United States
By Joseph P. Daniels† and Marc von der Ruhr‡
Using the results of a national identity survey, we test the impact of religious affiliation
on trade and immigration-policy preferences of US residents while controlling for individual
level of skill, political ideology and other important demographic characteristics. Our results
show that religion is an important determinant of international-policy preferences as
individuals who are pre-Vatican II Catholic or members of a fundamentalist Protestant
denomination are more likely to prefer policies that restrict imports and immigration.
Religiosity, in contrast, has a separate effect of moderating attitudes towards immigration. In
addition, we find evidence of denominational effects among African Americans in that
members of fundamentalist denominations tend to favour policies that restrict imports while
others do not, implying that statistical results commonly attributed to racial effects may
actually be a religion effect.

1. Introduction
Since Max Weber’s study of the Protestant ethic, scholars from a wide variety of
academic disciplines have debated the effects of religion on a nation’s economic performance.
Recently there is a renewed attention to the relationship between religion, international relations,
openness and economic growth [for summaries of the literature see Welch and Mueller (2001),
Dark (2000), Iannoccone (1998) and Smith and Sawkins (1998)]. Grossman and Helpman
(2000) make clear the importance of understanding societal ideas and preferences and the role
of special interest groups in shaping international policy. Yet, Philpott (2002) argues that until 11
September, international political-economy scholars have paid relatively little attention to the role
of religion. Nonetheless, a recent study on American views of globalization (PIPA, 2000),
however, shows that views on globalization are affected by moral beliefs and varying degrees of
1

confidence in a market-based system. Some also take the view that globalization is a threat to
religious beliefs in that globalization leads to ‘foreign’ values supplanting local ones (Foreign
Policy, 2004).
In this study, we examine the relationship between an individual’s affiliation with a
particular religious denomination and their preferences over trade and immigration policies. In a
manner similar to Milner (1988), we focus on individual attitudes and not policymakers’ actions
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and, therefore, do not account completely for trade and immigration policy outcomes. Implicitly,
we follow Guiso et al. (2003) who argue that religious beliefs are low frequency variables—based
on religious teachings and conditioned by the cultural environment of the religion—that affect
adherent attitudes towards the economic system. We, therefore, hypothesize that fundamentalist
denominations, on the one hand, are networks that generate Putnam’s (2003, p. 23) bonding
social capital—or strong in-group loyalty—while generating antagonism towards those outside
the fundamentalist network. Liberal and moderate Protestant denominations, on the other hand,
are bridging networks that are less threatened by modernization, generate relatively more
outward trust, and are less likely to be antagonistic towards outsiders. This view is perhaps best
represented by a recent Financial Times article (Financial Times, 14 May 2004, p. 4) on trade
and the US economy in which a textile worker is quoted as saying:
I am very worried about the ways things are going. The jobs are disappearing. We
need to get back to a biblical perspective of taking care of our own.
Although trade and immigration policy decisions do not hinge on public opinion alone, they are
an important element in international policymaking (see Graham, 1994 for a forceful argument).
We argue that religious affiliation is an important and often neglected force that shapes and
reinforces these attitudes.
Using data on the 1367 International Social Survey Policy respondents of the 1996
General Social Survey, we estimate ordered probit models of the responses to questions as to
whether the United States should restrict imports and whether the United States should increase
or reduce immigration. While testing denominational and religiosity effects, we control for
citizenship, gender, social class, resident of south census region, race, union membership,
political ideology, education and whether the respondent is employed in a sector with a
comparative advantage or disadvantage.
Our empirical results, in general, show that religious affiliation is indeed a statistically
significant determinant of trade and immigration-policy preferences. Specifically, individuals who
are members of a fundamentalist Protestant denomination or pre-Vatican II Catholic are more
likely to favour policies that restrict imports and immigration. Regarding Catholics, however, we
show that there is a statistically significant difference in the attitudes of pre-Vatican II Catholics
and post-Vatican II Catholics. Likewise, there is evidence that African Americans affiliated with
fundamentalist denominations are more likely to favour policies that restrict imports while African
Americans not affiliated with a fundamentalist denomination do not. The heterogeneity of our
results shows the importance of disaggregating Protestant denominations and controlling for
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changes in attitudes that occurred among older and younger Catholics. Consequently, previous
research that ignored the role of religion may have overstated the importance of other factors
such as race and region.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we discuss the economic
consequences of religious participation and why religion might matter for international-policy
preferences. In Section 3 we outline recent models of individual preferences for trade and
immigration policies. In Section 4 we describe the data used in the study. In Section 5 we explain
our econometric approach and provide results. Finally, we offer a conclusion and suggestions for
further research in Section 6.

2. Religious affiliation, participation and attitudes towards
international policies
In an extensive survey, Iannaccone (1998) separates studies of economics and religion
into three categories. The first line of research deals with the micro-foundations of religious
participation, the second addresses the economic consequences or outcomes of religious
participation, while the third line of research invokes religious teachings to critique economic
policies. This study is in keeping with the second area of research. The reader is referred to
Iannaccone for a comprehensive review of the literature in all three areas.

2.1 Religion and economic performance
There are a number of prominent empirical studies of the economic consequences of
religious affiliation on economic activity and growth in the literature. Because of space
considerations, we highlight but a few relevant papers here. The most recent studies on the link
between religious participation and economic outcomes include Guiso et al. (2003), who employ
survey data covering 66 countries. The authors find that religion promotes the development of
positive attitudes towards cooperation and the rule of law and government that are conducive to
economic growth. In contrast, they also find that religious individuals are less tolerant of women
working and more racist. By controlling for the dominant religion in each nation, they show that
these effects differ across denominations.
In a similar manner, Barro and McCleary (2003) use survey data covering 59 countries
and find that economic growth is positively affected by religious beliefs, but negatively by church
attendance even while controlling for possible reverse causation. In a similar manner, Mehanna
(2002) finds that countries whose dominant faith is Protestant tend to be more open, as
measured by imports as a percentage of GDP, than Catholic or Muslim nations.
Daniels, von der Ruhr 3

2.2 Why would religion matter for trade and immigration?
According to religion and sociology scholars such as Ammerman (1991), Marsden (1991)
and Tamney (2002), modernization, industrialization and urbanization of the early twentieth
century challenged both the moral certainty and social dominance of traditional Protestantism.
The fundamentalist movement was, therefore, a religious-based social movement counteracting
encroaching secularism and modernization. Coreno (2002, p. 337) argues that
‘...fundamentalists often form small interconnected independent denominations in the hope of
protecting a quarantined traditionalist culture inside a network of church-based institutions. They
nourish these enclave communities by separating themselves as much as possible from mainline
churches in particular, and secular culture in general’. He adds that southern fundamentalist
denominations, in particular, support a stronger sense of separatism. Moderate and liberal
Protestants, in contrast, are less threatened by secular society and tend to thrive more in a
modern world. They are also less concerned with biblical inerrancy and tend to treat religious
beliefs as more personal and private. Further, moderate or mainline denominations tend to relate
more inclusively with other denominations and engage more in ecumenical activities.
In regard to Catholics, Putnam et al. (1993) argue that the hierarchical structure of the
Roman Catholic Church in Italy hinders cooperation and trust of outsiders. Welch et al. (2004), in
contrast, claim that, at least since Vatican II, there is no reason to expect that Catholics would
trust ‘outsiders’ any less than mainstream Protestants. They claim that the American Catholic
Church is substantially different from the Church in Italy, and that most US Catholic parishes do
not maintain a rigid boundary against the outside culture. They further argue that there may well
be a difference among Catholics who were socialized into pre-Vatican II traditions relative to the
younger group of post-Vatican II Catholics.
Generalizing these various studies, we hypothesize that different religious denominations,
or networks, generate different types of social capital and, therefore, that the differing
approaches of fundamentalist, moderate and liberal Protestant denominations towards
modernization and encroaching secularism will be reflected in differing attitudes of individual
members towards others outside the individual’s religious network. More specifically, we argue
that fundamentalist denominations, on the one hand, are networks that generate Putnam’s (2003,
p. 23) bonding social capital—or strong in-group loyalty— while generating antagonism towards
those outside the fundamentalist network. Liberal and moderate Protestant denominations, on
the other hand, are bridging networks that are less threatened by modernization, generate
relatively more outward trust, and are less likely to be antagonistic towards outsiders. In addition,
the effects of Vatican II are likely to have moderated the bonding-network aspect of Catholicism

Daniels, von der Ruhr 4

in favour of greater acceptance of those outside the Catholic network.
Theories on social trust are important for understanding the impact of religiosity, or the
frequency that an individual participates in a religious network. Delhey and Newton (2002)
survey the main schools of thought on social trust. Voluntary Association theory postulates that
direct interaction with others on a sustained basis in voluntary organizations builds social trust.
Because participation in religious organizations is the predominant form of voluntary association
in the United States, religiosity may also condition individuals’ attitudes towards trade with others
outside the religious network and acceptance of immigrants into their communities. In other
words, voluntarily participating in a religious network is likely to generate the bridging type of
social capital referred to by Putnam (2000, p. 23), with ‘broader identities and reciprocity’. Hence,
we hypothesize that individuals who participate more in their respective religious networks,
regardless of affiliation, are less likely to favour policies that restrict imports and immigration.
Globalization is one present-day challenge to cultural boundaries forcing an awareness
of increasing global connectedness (Pieterse, 2004). Because of this challenge to their
traditionalist culture, we suspect that members of fundamentalist denominations are more likely
to oppose trade with others and more likely to desire restrictions on immigration, while members
of liberal and moderate Protestant denominations are less likely to oppose trade with others and
restrictions on immigration. In regard to Catholics, it is possible that changes in Catholic social
teaching brought about by Vatican II will be reflected in differences towards trade and
immigration policies in that post-Vatican II Catholics are more accepting of those outside their
religious network and hence less likely to favour restrictions on trade and immigration. Finally,
religiosity may have a different and separate effect than affiliation.

3. Modelling individual trade and immigration policy
preferences
Recent examinations of trade and immigration-policy preferences focus on two common
models of international trade policy preferences: the Ricardo–Viner model and the
Heckscher–Ohlin model. Both theories consider the effect of increased trade on input factor
returns and provide a framework to explain how individuals evaluate the effect of international
trade on their income. Because the literature is extensive, we focus only on the most recent and
otherwise refer the interested reader to the surveys provided by Scheve and Slaughter (2001a,
b) and Daniels and von der Ruhr (2003).
Scheve and Slaughter employ individual-level survey data for the United States to identify
if individual skill level or factor type is a significant determinant of trade-policy preferences. In the
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course of their analysis, they make an important contribution by showing that education, income
and employment classification all serve as a proxy measure of skill level. Hence, only one of
these variables should be included in any model of trade or immigration policy preferences. Their
major finding is that factor type rather than sector of employment influences trade and
immigration-policy preferences. Other demographic characteristics, entered as tests of the
robustness of factor type, such as gender, race and trade union membership were also found to
be significant determinants.
Daniels and von der Ruhr directly extend the analysis of Scheve and Slaughter to 10
advanced economies. Using both education and relative earnings as alternative measure of
individual skill level, they find that skill is a robust determinant of individual preferences on
immigration policies across countries. In two additional and broader cross-country working
papers, Mayda and Rodrik (2001) apply ordered estimation techniques to explain attitudes
towards trade and immigration using education as a measure of the individual’s level of skill,
while O’Rourke and Sinnott (2001) use the individual’s occupation classification. Both papers
find support for the factor endowment model. Hence, any study of trade and immigration-policy
preferences should control for individual skill level.

4. Survey data
The data employed in this study are the results of a survey conducted and compiled by
Zentralarchiv für Empirische Sozialforschung as the International Social Survey Program (ISSP)
2

titled ISSP: National Identity. In the United States, the ISSP is administered as part of the
General Social Survey (GSS), but only a subset of the GSS participants are administered the
3

ISSP questionnaire. The combination of both the ISSP and the GSS surveys yield a unique
dataset as the 1996 ISSP portion contains questions on imports and immigration while the GSS
portion contains, in addition to standard demographic data, detailed information on the
individual’s religious affiliation and religiosity. Though information on religious affiliation is
reported back to the ISSP, the GSS makes much finer distinctions among denominations that
are not found in the ISSP data. Because of the uniquely heterogeneous nature of religion in the
United States, these distinctions are not available for other countries in the ISSP data and,
therefore, we limit our analysis here to residents of the United States.

4.1 Description of the dependent variables
The first survey item used in this study asks: ‘How much do you agree or disagree with
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the following statement: the United States should limit the import of foreign products in order to
protect its national economy?’ Five possible responses range from agree strongly to strongly
disagree. The second item asks: ‘Do you think the number of immigrants to the United States
nowadays should be increased or decreased?’ Five possible responses range from increased a
lot to reduced a lot. Those who could not choose or refused to answer the questions were coded
as missing. Table 1 provides the survey items on policy preferences, summarizes the responses
and indicates the proportion of missing observations.

4.2 Description of the independent variables
Following the literature, we control for a number of factors that may shape an individual’s
international economic policy preferences. In general, we control for demographics, individual
skill level, sector of employment and political ideology, while testing the significance of religious
affiliation and religiosity. Each variable is described below and summary data are provided in
Table 2.
Demographic variables
Noncitizen is a dummy variable indicating whether the respondent is a citizen with a value
of zero or non-citizen with a value of unity. It is expected that non-citizens are more likely to
oppose policies that restrict trade and favour policies that increase immigration. Female is a
dichotomous variable that takes the value of unity for female and zero for male. Previous studies
find evidence, though not consistently significant, indicating that women are more likely to
support trade barriers, but that gender is not a significant determinant of immigration-policy
preferences. Age is a continuous variable. It is hypothesized that older respondents are more
likely to favour policies that restrict international trade and immigration, though age has not been
shown to be a consistently significant determinant of global economic policy preferences.
Social Class is the individual’s perspective of their socio-economic status. It is a discrete
variable that ranges in value from unity for lower class to six for upper class. South is a dummy
variable for the south US Census region. Individuals in the other three regions, therefore, serve
as the benchmark for the estimated differential impact of the south. The research on religion and
economic growth indicates that a dominant religion affects the culture of a nation and may be the
source of cross-country differences in attitudes towards markets and market processes. Hence,
if a particular religion dominates a region of a nation, we may see a regional effect that is actually
reflecting the influence of the dominant religion along the lines suggested by von der Ruhr and
Daniels (2004). Previous research finds that individuals who live in ‘gateway’
communities—communities that are typical destinations of immigrants—are not more likely to
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oppose immigration.
African American is a dichotomous variable that takes the value of unity if the respondent
is African American and zero otherwise. The literature provides mixed evidence on the role of
race and ethnicity as determinants of trade and immigration policy preferences. Union Member
indicates if the respondent and/ or their spouse is a member of a trade union with a value of unity
and zero otherwise. Numerous studies of US residents conclude that trade union members are
more likely to favour restricting international trade, but union membership is not a significant
4

determinant of immigration-policy preferences.
Political Ideology
For a comprehensive discussion of political ideology and attitudes towards globalization
see Steger (2002, Ch. 4). Previous studies show that those who identify with the far right are
more likely to favour policies that restrict trade and are more likely to favour policies that restrict
immigration. Similar to previous studies, we model Political Ideology with a categorical variable
that ranges from unity (indicating someone who views their political ideology as far left) to five
(indicating someone views their political ideology as far right).
Individual skill level and sector of employment
Scheve and Slaughter (2001b) show that, if controlling for political ideology and
demographic characteristics, education or earnings are appropriate measures of labour market
skills and should be included as an economic factor as opposed to a demographic factor. More
importantly, they show that education and earnings should not be included in the same model.
Because of the number of missing values—294 for earnings as opposed to 3 for education—we
use education as a proxy measure of individual skill throughout the paper. Nonetheless, in
general, our results are the same for both education and earnings (available upon request).
Education is a continuous variable that indicates the number of years of schooling the
respondent has completed. Based on standard trade theory, described earlier, respondents with
lower levels of education (skill) are more likely to agree with policy actions that restrict trade and
immigration.
Individuals that are employed in sectors at a comparative advantage in the global market
may be less likely to favour restrictions on trade and immigration while those employed in sectors
at a comparative disadvantage and, therefore, most threatened by trade and immigration, may
favour restriction. To control for sector of employment, we follow Mayda and Rodrik (2001,
Appendix II), using the adjusted net exports of a sector as an indicator of comparative advantage
or disadvantage. First, we use data on the export and import shares of US manufacturing sectors
at the two-digit Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) as found in Campa and Goldberg (1997).
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In contrast to Mayda and Rodrik, we also measure the export and import shares of agriculture,
forestry and fisheries using data from the US Department of Agriculture, and we proxy for mining,
using the export and import shares for the coal industry from the National Mining Association.
We create two dummy variables using the data above in combination with the 1988
Standard Industrial Classification three-digit code contained in the GSS data. The first variable,
Comparative Advantage, assigns a value of unity to respondents employed in industries with a
positive adjusted net export measure and zero to all others. The second variable, Comparative
Disadvantage, assigns unity to individuals in industries with a negative adjusted net export
measure and zero to all others. The base group, therefore, is individuals employed all other
industries and assumed to be non-trading industries.
Religious affiliation
The survey instrument asked individuals if they belong to a major religious group. There
were approximately 30 denominations the individual could identify with including Catholic,
Jewish, Moslem, major Protestant denominations, Shinto, Hindu, Buddhist and Sikh. Individuals
were also allowed to select no affiliation or to refuse to answer. In our sample, individuals
identified with Catholic, Jewish, Baptist, Methodist, Lutheran, Episcopalian, other Protestant, and
two refused to answer and were coded as missing. The frequency of attending religious services,
Religiosity, is included in each model containing religious affiliation. This variable ranges from
zero for individuals who do not attend at all during the course of a year to eight for those who
attend more than once a week.
As previously indicated, the GSS provides additional coding for individuals that took part
in the ISSP, allowing much finer distinction of religious affiliation in the United States. The
National Opinion Research Center (NORC) provides a classification scheme of Protestant
denominations along the fundamentalistmoderate-liberal spectrum, and GSS Methodological
Report Number 43 provides details and a complete listing of denominations in their respective
categories. According to Smith (1987, 1990), the National Opinion Research Center (NORC)
framework uses biblical inerrancy, beliefs in the personal salvation or born-again experience,
beliefs in the personal and imminent return of Christ, evangelical or revivalist attitudes and
acceptance of traditional Protestant beliefs such as the existence of angels and devils, as
metrics to separate denominations along the fundamentalist—liberal spectrum. Using this
classification system, we re-estimate the empirical models to determine if there are differential
effects among Protestant denominations along the fundamentalist to liberal spectrum.
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4.3 The Second Vatican Council
The Second Vatican Council represents the most significant change in Catholic doctrine
and Catholic social teaching in the past 450 years. Scholars such as Roof and McKinney (1987)
and Greeley (1981) document the differences in attitudes among older Catholics and younger
Catholics following Vatican II on issues such as premarital sex, divorce and birth control. In
addition, the percentage of Catholics attending a parish school declined following Vatican II.
Regarding the impact of Vatican II on economic attitudes, Guiso et al. (2002, p. 34) argue that
some of the negative impact of Catholicism on economic development no longer exists and that
more moderate post-Vatican II Catholicism is not a significant obstacle to economic development.
If indeed religious affiliation is an important determinant of individual attitudes, then these
important changes should be reflected in the data. Specifically, we expect post-Vatican II
Catholics to have more moderate attitudes towards trade and immigration policies.
To investigate a potential Vatican II effect, we follow Guiso et al. (2002) and separate
Catholics into two cohort groups, those born before 1962 and those born after, creating a dummy
5

variable equal to unity if the individual is Catholic and in the particular age-cohort group. To
control for a potential generational shift that could be captured by, and attributed to the Vatican II
controls for Catholics, we include a dummy variable for all non-Catholics born after 1962. Hence,
the control group is all non-Catholics born prior to 1962.

5. Econometric results
Our objective is to determine if an individual’s religious affiliation holds any additional
insight into their trade and immigration-policy preferences. Our approach, therefore, is to add
religious affiliation and religiosity to the models of international-policy preferences described
earlier, thereby controlling for other important individual demographic, economic and political
characteristics. Given that the multiple categories of responses to the survey questions follow a
natural order, we use an ordered probit model.
To try to understand the importance of religion, differing denominational effect,
interactions with race and the impact of Vatican II, we estimate five different models of each
dependent variable. The first model is a base model that allows us to benchmark the results of
our data and allow comparison with the literature. The second model adds the individual’s major
religious affiliation and religiosity. The third model separates Protestants along the
fundamentalist to liberal spectrum. The fourth model separates African Americans into two
6

cohort groups; those in a fundamentalist denomination and all other African Americans. The fifth
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examines the potential impact of Vatican II on Catholic’s attitudes towards trade and immigration
policies. Because some Protestant denominations are not coded by the NORC into the
fundamentalist to liberal scheme, some observations are lost moving from model to model. The
number of observations for each model is included at the bottom of each table of results.

5.1 Attitudes towards International Trade Policies
Table 3 provides the ordered probit estimates for the survey item on whether the United
States should restrict imports. As with other ordered choice models, the magnitudes of the
estimated coefficients of the ordered probit models are notoriously difficult to interpret. In this
section we discuss those coefficients that are significant. In Section 5.3, we simulate the relative
effects of the key variables.
The results of the base model, model 1, indicate that older respondents, respondents
residing in the south, African Americans, union members, respondents who identify their political
ideology to the right and respondents employed in sectors at a comparative disadvantage are
more likely to agree with policies that restrict imports. The base model also indicates that
non-residents, respondents who identify their social class to the upper end of the scale and more
educated respondents are less likely to agree with policies that restrict imports. Similar to Mayda
and Rodrik, employment in a sector with a comparative advantage is not significant.
Model 2 shows that Catholics are more likely to favour policies that restrict imports, but
Protestant, Jewish, other religions, as well as religiosity are not significant. Model 3 illustrates the
hypothesized difference among Protestant denominations with fundamentalists more likely to
favour policies that restrict imports while moderates and liberals are not statistically significantly
different from the base group (of individuals that do not profess an affiliation with a religious
denomination). Note that in model 3, African American is no longer significant. Hence, in model 4
we separate African Americans into cohorts of those who belong to a fundamentalist
denomination and those that do not. (We also remove fundamentalist African Americans from
the fundamentalist Protestant group.) Model 4 shows that the typical assumption that African
American opposition to free trade is racially based may be incorrect, and that this opposition is
driven by religious affiliation, similar to white fundamentalists.
Model 5 separates Catholics into pre-Vatican II and post-Vatican II cohort groups and
adds a control for all non-Catholics born after Vatican II. Hence, non-Catholics born prior to
Vatican II is the base group for these cohort variables. The results in model 5 show that
pre-Vatican II Catholics are more likely to favour policies that restrict imports while post-Vatican II
Catholics and all others born after Vatican II are not statistically significantly different from the
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base group.

5.2 Attitudes towards Immigration Policies
Table 4 provides the estimates for the immigration models. The estimates for the base
model indicate that older respondents, individuals that identify with lower social classes, those
who identify their political ideology to the right and lower educated respondents are more likely to
support policies that restrict immigration, while non-citizens and African Americans are more
likely to favour policies that increase immigration.
Model 2 adds the major religious denominations and the results indicate that Protestants
are more likely to support policies that restrict immigration while greater religiosity actually moves
individuals to prefer policies that increase immigration. This result for religiosity supports the
hypothesis that greater participation in a religious network builds bridging social caption and a
broader sense of identity and reciprocity, and that affiliation and religiosity are two separate
effects.
Model 3 separates Protestants into moderates, liberals and fundamentalists. The results
indicate that the statistically significant result for Protestants is due to fundamentalists favouring
restrictions on immigration. The impact of belonging to a fundamentalist denomination is
highlighted to a greater degree in model 4, which shows that the result for African Americans
pertains only to those not affiliated with a fundamentalist denomination. Finally, model 5
indicates that pre-Vatican II Catholics are more likely to favour policies that restrict immigration
while post-Vatican II Catholics and all other post-Vatican II respondents are not. It is important to
note, however, that introduction of the post-Vatican II dummy increased the significance level of
fundamentalists while making liberal Protestants marginally significant, raising suspicion that
there may be a generational effect not fully captured by our models.

5.3 Interpretation of Model Estimates
To better understand the impact of religious affiliation on global policy preferences, we
simulate the effect of key variables so as to isolate the impact on the probability that an individual
chooses one of the responses to the survey questions detailed in Table 1 (along the lines
suggested by King et al., 2000). The simulations are conducted using Clarify: Software for
Interpreting and Presenting Statistical Results (Tomz et al., 2001). The process involves drawing
1000 simulated parameters from an asymptotic sampling distribution that is multivariate normal,
and whose mean is equal to the vector of parameter estimates and variance equal to the
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variance–covariance matrix of estimates. Next, the simulated parameters are used to calculate
two sets of probabilities.
Using religious affiliation as an example, we first re-estimate model 5 and then set all
binary explanatory variables at their majority value (so that female is equal to one while
non-citizen, south, African American, Union Member, Comparative Advantage and Comparative
Disadvantage are equal to zero), all denomination variables at zero and the remaining variables
at their mean value. In other words, the ‘typical’ individual in our dataset is treated as if they have
no religious affiliation. From this we generate the predicted probability of response to each
category of the survey question. Next, we change every individual’s affiliation to, say,
fundamentalist and repeat the simulation generating new predicted probabilities. To get a sense
of the relative importance of religious affiliation, we include the simulated effects of a one
standard deviation reduction in education—shown in previous studies as a highly significant
determinant of trade and immigration-policy attitudes—as a benchmark. The changes in
predicted probabilities for variables of interest are illustrated in Figures 1 and 2.
Policies to restrict imports
Figure 1 shows the change in predicted probabilities for the five categories of the
question on restricting imports for model 5 in Table 3. In general, the figure shows how each
variable of interest shifts the distribution of probable responses upward, that is, towards the
categories of ‘agree strongly’ and ‘agree’ away from the categories of ‘neither agree nor
disagree’, ‘disagree’ and ‘disagree strongly’. The mean value of education is approximately 13.5
years. We change this variable to its 25th percentile value—approximately 12 years—to obtain
the marginal effects of education. Next, education is set at its mean value again and all
respondents are coded as fundamentalist and the probabilities are also simulated again. This is
then repeated for pre-Vatican II Catholics.
Figure 1 shows that the denominational effects rival that of education, as pre-Vatican II
increases the probability that an individual will agree strongly with policies that restrict imports by
more than 9.5% and fundamentalist by more than 7.5%, while a one standard deviation reduction
in education (from 1.5 years of post-high-school education to a high-school education) increases
this probability by 4.5%. For the category of ‘agree’, however, the changes are 4.1%, 3.7% and
5.7%, respectively. Nonetheless, the religion effects dominate the education effect in three of the
five categories. To present this in another way, education would need to be reduced to 10.5
years (from the mean of 13.5 years) to generate the same impact on attitudes as these two
denominational effects.
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Policies to change immigration into the respondent’s country
Figure 2 illustrates the change in the simulated probabilities for the various response
categories for education, fundamentalist, pre-Vatican II Catholic and religiosity. As shown in the
figure, the pre-Vatican II effect is relatively larger than religiosity and education as the probability
that they support policies that reduce immigration a lot increases by 10.9%. If the individual
belongs to a fundamentalist denomination, the increase is 10%, and if education is reduced by
one-and-one-half years it is 3.6%. The simulation for religiosity represents an increase from the
mean value by plus one standard deviation (from attending services roughly one a month to
nearly every week). The effect of this increase in religiosity is to decrease the probability that an
individual will favour policies that restrict immigration a lot by 2.1% and to reduce immigration a
little by slightly less than 0.5%.

6. Conclusion
In this paper we argue that religious affiliation is an important and often neglected force
that shapes and reinforces attitudes towards trade and immigration policies. We hypothesize that
different religious denominations generate different types of social capital and that the differing
approaches of fundamentalist, moderate and liberal Protestant denominations towards
modernization and encroaching secularism will be reflected in differing attitudes of individual
members towards others outside the individual’s religious network. More specifically, we argue
that fundamentalist denominations, on the one hand, are networks that generate Putnam’s (2003,
p. 23) bonding social capital—or strong in-group loyalty—while generating antagonism towards
those outside the fundamentalist network. Liberal and moderate Protestant denominations, on
the other hand, are bridging networks that are less threatened by modernization, generate
relatively more outward trust and are less likely to be antagonistic towards outsiders. In addition,
the effects of Vatican II are likely to have moderated the bonding-network aspect of Catholicism
in favour of greater acceptance of those outside the Catholic network. Because globalization
challenges cultural boundaries and traditionalist culture, we suspect that members of
fundamentalist denominations are more likely to oppose trade with others and more likely to
desire restrictions on immigration. Furthermore, changes in Catholic social teaching brought
about by Vatican II will be reflected in differences towards trade and immigration policies in that
post-Vatican II Catholics are likely to be more accepting of those outside their religious network,
and hence less likely to favour restrictions on trade and immigration. Finally, religiosity may have
a different and separate effect than affiliation effects.
Using the results of a survey of national identity of US residents, we test the impact of
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religious affiliation on trade and immigration-policy preferences while controlling for the
individual’s level of skill, their political ideology and other important demographic characteristics.
Our results show that individuals who are pre-Vatican II Catholic or members of a fundamentalist
denomination are more likely to prefer policies that restrict imports and immigration. Furthermore,
religiosity has a separate effect of moderating opposition towards immigration. In addition, we
find evidence of denominational effects among African Americans in that members of
fundamentalist denominations tend to favour policies that restrict imports while others do not,
implying that statistical results commonly attributed to racial effects may actually be a religion
effect.
Based on our results, we conclude that religion does matter, and that the beliefs
produced by specific religious denominations shape public opinion towards trade and
immigration thereby representing an important source of resistance to deeper cultural interaction.
It is our hope that this paper will motivate greater interest in the subject of religion in the context
of international policies. For example, if religion is important to economic performance, what is
the process through which religious beliefs eventually move into policy outcomes?
Amstutz (2001) focuses specifically on the role of religion in shaping foreign policy and
provides a helpful outline for framing this question. According to Amstutz, there are three ways
that religious organizations can affect foreign policy. First, institutions may directly affect foreign
policy. In the 1960s, 40% of members said that their churches should participate in the political
process. This grew to more than 50% by the 1990s. Hence, there is an exchange between
religious leaders and their members that allow religious organizations to lobby (in one way or
another) for policy actions. Second, religious organization may also affect foreign policy through
ideas. Because religious organizations deal with issues such as equality, just war and
subsidiarity, they can help to illuminate and influence perceptions of globalization and facilitate
debate on foreign policy issues. As a result, religious values and norms play an indirect, not
direct, role in the formation of foreign policy by affecting the attitudes of individuals and thereby
shaping public opinion. Finally, because religious organizations provide important humanitarian
assistance, they can affect foreign policy through service.
We argue that this second avenue of influence is important for trade and immigration
policy decisions, in spite of the fact that there is little in the literature to date that examines the
link between religious affiliation and attitudes towards global economic policies. We suggest that
future research also consider how the impact of religion on policy preferences is changing across
generations of religious adherents.
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1. Jubilee 2000—named after the Old Testament concept of Leviticus 25:10 of
returning land back to original owners—is an example of the importance of organized
religions on global policy.
2. Independent institutions in each country collected the data for the ISSP. Neither
the original collectors nor the ZENTRALARCHIV bear any responsibility for the analyses or
interpretation presented here.
3. In 1995, 1367 of the 2904 GSS respondents were administered the ISSP
questionnaire.
4. This difference is consistent with union positions on these two issues. For
example, the AFL-CIO ‘Agenda For All America’ (AFL-CIO, 2002) item (2) is ‘Keep good jobs
and level the playing field. In the past year alone, more that one million manufacturing jobs
have fallen victim to flawed trade policies and inadequate protections for workers in the
global economy. We must develop an effective strategy and programme for stopping the
exports of good jobs and reindustrializing the US economy’. While John Sweeney (AFL-CIO,
2000), speaking on the Restoration of Fairness in Immigration Act stated: ‘The AFL-CIO
proudly stands on the side of immigrant workers. Throughout the history of this country,
immigrants have played an important role in building our nation and its democratic
institutions’.
5. To test the sensitivity of these results to the year that was picked for constructing
the dummy variables, we moved the year ahead five years and back five years and our
results were consistent in terms of sign and significance.
6. This grouping separates the 186 African Americans in the sample into 110 in
fundamentalist denominations and 76 who are not in fundamentalist denominations.
7. Following the estimation of model 5 of both the trade question and the immigration
question, we simultaneously test for pairwise equality and joint significance of the
denomination dummies. (The test statistic is a X2.) For the trade model, the null of pairwise
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equality and jointly equal to zero is rejected with a P-value of 2.39%, and for the immigration
model the null is rejected with a P-value of 1.05%, indicating that there is difference among
the denomination coefficients and that they are jointly significantly different from zero.
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Appendix
Table 1: Summary of dependent variables
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Table 2: Summary statistics on independent variables

Daniels, von der Ruhr 21

Table 3: The United should limit the import of foreign products: ordered probit results

Daniels, von der Ruhr 22

Table 4: The number of immigrants to the United States should be ordered probit results
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Figure 1: US should restrict imports
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Figure 2: The number of immigrants
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